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ABSTRACT
This is a  comprehensive study of the U.S. political process from the perspective 
of media, voters and candidates. In the first chapter, I analyze the sources of media bias. 
In the second chapter, I focus on economically self-interested voting. The third chapter 
studies the effectiveness of negative campaigning. In the next three paragraphs, I 
summarize these three chapters
With the advent of internet, many U.S. metropolitan areas have seen newspaper 
closures due to declining revenues. This provides the researcher with an opportunity to 
analyze the microeconomic sources of media bias. This paper uses a large panel data set 
of newspaper archives for 102 newspapers over 238 months (1990-2009). I find that, 
after  controlling  for  the  unemployment  rate  and  the  change  in  unemployment  rate, 
conservative newspapers report 19% more unemployment news when the President is a 
Democrat rather than a Republican, before the closure of a rival newspaper in the same 
media  market.  This  effect  is  12%  for  liberal  newspapers.  After  the  closure,  these 
numbers are 3.5% and 1%, respectively. This moderation of media bias after closure of a 
rival newspaper stands as newspaper size, newspaper fixed-effects or metropolitan area 
fixed-effects  are included.  I  also find that  newspapers in smaller  metropolitan areas 
have a larger moderation in their  bias.  My findings  provide support for theories in 
which media-bias is demand-driven, as surviving newspapers aim to increase their sales 
by gaining the former readers of a closed newspaper in the same media market.
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A long literature investigates the influence of income on voting behavior, but it 
focuses primarily on presidential elections. We ask whether economically self-interested 
voting is unique to the presidential elections, or if it also extends to House, Senate and 
gubernatorial elections. In addition, for each office, we look for the presence of absolute 
income  effects  and  relative  income  effects.  Voters  do  indeed  appear  to  vote  in  an 
economically self-interested manner for each office, but we show that in all elections but 
presidential elections, this effect is largely generated by the correlation of income with 
political issue stances. Controlling for voter stances on a number of social and economic 
issues,  there  is  little  evidence  of  partisan  differences  in  voting  according  to  income 
outside  of  presidential  elections.  Our findings  at  once  support  previous  studies,  but 
illustrate that presidential elections are very much a special case in US socio-political 
behavior. 
Political candidates commonly use negative TV ads to attack their opponents. In 
very limited research on effectiveness of negative campaigning,  endogeneity problem 
has not been addressed and trait ads were not separated from issue ads. In this project, I 
use instrumental variables estimates of the effectiveness of negative campaigning and 
distinguish between issue ads and trait ads. Using 162 U.S. Senate Elections between 
1998 and 2008, I find that negative issue campaigning is effective for challengers in 
significantly reducing the incumbent’s vote, although this effect is not large enough to 
change the election outcome in lopsided elections. In competitive elections, I find that 
challenger’s  negative  issue  ads  can  change  the  election  outcome.  I  do  not  find  any 
significant effects of negative issue ads by an incumbent, except for competitive
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elections. Both incumbents and challengers hurt themselves if they resort to negative 
trait ads (personal attacks).
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CHAPTER 1: 
WHAT DRIVES MEDIA BIAS? 
A PANEL STUDY OF NEWSPAPER ARCHIVES: 1990-2009†
I. Introduction
On February 27th, 2009, the Rocky Mountain News closed after 150 years in 
operation, leaving the Denver Post as the only major newspaper in the Denver 
metropolitan area. With the advent of internet, newspapers have seen significant 
declines in their revenues from sales and advertisements, which in turn caused such 
closures.  I was able to identify 24 newspaper closures between January 1990 and 
October 2009. These closures provide an excellent opportunity to analyze the source of 
media bias. The basic idea is that, if media-bias is demand-driven, then a surviving 
newspaper could expand its reader base by moderating its bias to reach out to the 
former readers of the closed rival newspaper in the same media market. On the other 
hand, if supply-side factors are driving media bias, then a surviving newspaper would 
not change its bias, as editors or owners of the newspaper did not change after closure of 
the rival newspaper. In order to analyze the sources of media bias, one first has to define 
media bias.
A common type of media bias is the agenda-setting behavior of newspapers. As 
Cohen(1963) states: the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people 
what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about”. 
Several studies have found that unemployment rate  is a strong predictor of  the success 
of an incumbent president’s political party, in both midterm election years and 
presidential election years (see Abramowitz (1988), Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder 
(2007)). In order to influence election results, a conservative newspaper may report 
more unemployment news under a Democratic President than a Republican President, 
even if the unemployment rate is the same. This would be a supply-side factor as 
newspaper editors or owners aim to affect the election outcomes. On the other hand, 
such behavior may be demand-driven, as newspapers want to increase their profits by 
†  Acknowledgements: I would like to thank  Mattias Polborn, Richard Akresh, Dan Bernhardt and 
participants of the research seminar at the Department of Economics. As usual, I am responsible for any 
errors.
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reaching out to new readers, who may have a taste for newspapers slanted towards their 
own political views. It is important to analyze whether demand-side factors, such as 
readers’ political views; or supply-side factors, such as the political views of newspaper 
owners or editors, explain the reasons behind media bias.
Media bias can affect election outcomes and this in turn can affect the types of 
public policies that are implemented. Therefore, it is important to analyze the 
microeconomic reasons behind media bias. I ask whether newspaper closures led to a 
change in behavior of surviving newspapers in the same media market. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study that exploits newspaper closures in order to analyze the 
sources of media bias. In addition, I have not found any studies of declining competition 
among newspapers and its long-term effects. 
I use a panel data set of 102 newspapers over 238 months, from 1990 to 2009. 
This period has seen two Republican and two Democratic Presidents. To my knowledge, 
this is the longest empirical study of newspaper archives.  I ran an online keyword 
search of newspaper archives to construct my data set. One advantage of an online 
keyword search is the absence of a human-based content analysis. The same search 
procedure is applied to every newspaper objectively and no subjective judgment is made 
on whether to include or exclude an article. Another advantage is that such a keyword 
search is easily replicable for future research.
First, I divide the sample of newspapers into three groups according to their 
historical endorsement pattern: conservative newspapers, liberal newspapers and 
moderate newspapers. My empirical strategy involves a fixed-effects panel regression 
model to estimate the effects of a rival newspaper’s closure on the surviving newspapers’ 
reporting of unemployment news, for each group. It is also important to see how smaller 
changes in endorsement pattern can affect its agenda-setting behavior, rather than 
dividing the sample into three large groups. Thus, I create an alignment index 
representing the ideological distance between a newspaper and the President. Then, I 
use this index to analyze the effects of smaller changes in endorsement pattern. Finally, 
in large metropolitan areas, a newspaper closure might not have as much of an impact 
on surviving newspapers, as there are more newspapers in such areas. Therefore, I 
divide the sample into two groups according to the population of the Metropolitan 
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Statistical Area (MSA). All my regressions control for unemployment rate, change in 
unemployment rate, size of the newspaper and newspaper fixed-effects.
I find that as the newspaper’s and the President’s political affiliation become 
more aligned, the newspaper reports unemployment articles less, even if the 
unemployment rate and change in unemployment rate are controlled for. My main 
result is that newspapers moderate this bias significantly after the closure of a rival 
newspaper. After controlling for the unemployment rate and the change in 
unemployment rate, conservative newspapers report 19% more unemployment news 
when the President is a Democrat than when the President is a Republican, before the 
closure. The corresponding bias is 12% for liberal newspapers. After the closure of a 
rival, these numbers are reduced to 3.5% and 1%, respectively. Moderate newspapers do 
not display statistically significant bias either before or after closure. This moderation of 
media bias after the closure lends credit to demand-side factors. Newspapers see an 
opportunity to increase their profits after the closure of a rival newspaper and they 
reach out to the former readers of that newspaper by moderating their bias.
When I rank newspapers according to their alignment index, a change from 25th 
percentile to 75th percentile alignment leads to 15% reduction in reporting of 
unemployment news, before the closure of a rival newspaper. This effect is reduced to 
5% after the closure. In large media markets, these effects are significantly weaker than 
in small media markets. This is plausible given that there may still be considerable 
competition in large media markets even after the closure of a newspaper. As a 
robustness check, I use newspaper slant measured by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), 
rather than the endorsement pattern of the newspaper, as a way to classify newspapers 
as conservative, liberal or moderate. My results still had the same signs and significance. 
This is to be expected as endorsement pattern and newspaper slant were highly 
correlated. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section II summarizes the related 
literature. Section III explains my data set. In Section IV, I discuss my empirical strategy 
and report the main results. Section V concludes.
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II. Related Literature
Media bias can have significant political consequences. Berhnardt, Krasa and 
Polborn (2008) show that media bias can lead to the election of a candidate who would 
not be elected in the absence of media bias. Their model involves asymmetrically 
distributed voter ideologies, a polarized electorate, and profit-maximizing media firms. 
My results lend support to the profit-maximization assumption of media firms, as I find 
significant evidence for demand-driven media bias.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) develop a new index of newspaper slant based on 
the similarity between a newspaper’s language and that of a congressional Republican or 
Democrat. For example, the same tax is called the “estate tax” by Democrats, while it is 
called the “death tax” by Republicans. Gentzkow and Shapiro use this index to analyze 
whether newspaper slant is demand or supply driven. They find that newspapers 
respond strongly to consumer preferences, while identity of a newspaper’s owner 
explains far less of the variation in slant. I use a new approach of using newspaper 
closures in order to analyze media bias. This approach allows for a study of declining 
competition on media bias.
Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder (2007) ask a different question of whether a 
newspaper’s past endorsement pattern affects its reporting of news on unemployment, 
inflation, budget deficit and trade deficit. They find evidence that newspapers with a 
pro-Republican endorsement pattern overreport unemployment news under a 
Democratic President than a Republican President. An analogous effect also exists for 
newspapers with a pro-Democratic endorsement pattern. They do not find such an 
effect in the reporting of news on inflation, budget deficit or trade deficit. Their objective 
is to see whether media bias exists in the reporting of these four economic variables. My 
research differs in its main question of what drives media bias and its usage of 
newspaper closures in order to analyze the sources of media bias. Their research 
involves an online keyword search of newspaper archives for the period 1996-2005. This 
period had only one Democratic President and one Republican President. My project 
adds an additional 10 years of observations and covers the two decades from 1990 to 
October 2009. This period includes two Democratic and  two Republican Presidents. 
This allows for  more variation in media bias and a larger sample size.
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III. Data 
Newspaper Archives
My unit of observation is a newspaper-year-month combination. I collected two 
sets of data for 102 newspapers over 238 months, from January 1990 to October 2009. 
All of these newspapers were still in operation as of October 2009. Archives for 99 
newspapers were available on the NewsLibrary electronic archives1, while I used 
ProQuest Archiver2 for the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago 
Tribune. The first data set was constructed through an online keyword search of the 
articles about national unemployment rate. I searched for keywords “unemployment” or 
“jobless”3 in order to identify the number of unemployment articles that appeared in a 
newspaper over a month. My second data set was a keyword search of the word “and” in 
order to identify the number of total articles about any topic, published in a newspaper 
over a month. I also ran a keyword search on punctuation mark “.” as another way of 
identifying the number of total articles. This search and the keyword search on the word 
“and” had a correlation coefficient of 0.993 for 5 randomly selected newspapers . 
Therefore, I proceeded with the keyword  search on “and”. Using the number of 
unemployment articles and the number of total articles, I constructed my dependant 
variable, which is the relative frequency of unemployment articles out of total articles 
for each newspaper-month combination. This relative frequency is represented as a 
percentage using the following formula:
Where jtRF  denotes the relative frequency of unemployment articles for newspaper j in 
month t.
Newspaper Closures
1 Data and documentation is available from the Newslibrary website, http://www.newslibrary.com
2
2
 Data and documentation is available from the Proquest Archiver website, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com
3 Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder (2007) conducted a preliminary search to identify the exact wording of the 
search strings in order to minimize the number of false positive and false negative hits.
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I obtained a list of closed newspapers from Wikipedia4. For each closed 
newspaper, I identified the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) from the 2000 US 
Census and the closure date. The closure date was obtained either from the closed 
newspaper’s information page on Wikipedia or from a search of that newspaper using an 
online search engine. Finally, I matched the MSA of the closed newspaper to the MSA of 
surviving newspapers in my data set. From now on, I call the MSAs with closures 
“closure markets”. If this was a natural experiment, the observations that are after the 
closure of a rival newspaper in a closure market would constitute my treatment group. 
The control group would consist of all observations that are not in closure markets and 
observations in closure markets before the closure date. The following binary variable 
identifies my treatment group:
Newspaper’s Political Inclination
Ansolabehere, Lessem and Snyder (2006) create an endorsement index for 85 
newspapers based on the newspaper’s editorial endorsements of political candidates 
from 1986 to 2002. This index represents a newspaper’s tendency to endorse 
Republican or Democrat candidates and it controls for the incumbency and quality of a 
political candidate.  Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder (2007) supplement this with data on 
17 additional newspapers to reach a total of 102 newspapers. I obtained the 
endorsement index from these two sources for 99 newspapers in my data set, since the 
Rocky Mountain News, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer and the Cincinnati Post have 
closed since the creation of this index. Negative numbers indicate a pro-Republican 
endorsement pattern, while positive numbers correspond to a Democratic endorsement 
pattern. Figure 1 displays the newspapers by endorsement index. Most newspapers were 
located between -0.5 and 0.5 and there were more newspapers with a pro-Democratic 
endorsement pattern than a pro-Republican endorsement pattern.
4 List of defunct newspapers of the United States, available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_defunct_newspapers_of_the_United_States
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Alternatively, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2007) measure the slant of  newspapers. 
Their approach includes first identifying the language used by Republicans and 
Democrats. For instance, Democrats use the term “estate tax” for the same tax that 
Republicans call “death tax”. After identifying such language, they calculate a slant 
measure that represents the correlation between the newspaper’s language and a 
political party’s language. I also use this slant measure instead of endorsement index as 
a robustness check of the results.  I adjusted this measure so that lower numbers 
correspond to conservative newspapers, as they did for endorsement index. 
Unemployment Rate
The U.S. Unemployment Rate is announced in the beginning of every month for 
the previous month. For each month, I obtained previous month’s unemployment rate 
from Bureau of Labor Statistics. As the unemployment rate goes up, the newspapers are 
expected to report more unemployment articles. Figure 2 shows the relative frequency 
of unemployment articles with respect to the previous month’s unemployment rate. The 
correlation coefficient between previous month’s unemployment rate and number of 
unemployment articles was 0.48. It is also plausible that a jump in unemployment rate 
between previous two months can affect the reporting of such news. In Figure 3, I graph 
the relative frequency of unemployment articles with respect to change in 
unemployment rate between last two months. The correlation coefficient between 
change in unemployment rate and number of unemployment articles was 0.20.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 displays summary statistics. My data set includes newspapers from 86 
MSAs, 24 of which had a closure between January 1990 and October 2009. There were 
28 surviving newspapers in the closure markets. This time period includes about 2 years 
of George H. W. Bush, 8 years of Bill Clinton, 8 years of George W. Bush and 9 months 
of Barack Obama. About 9% of the archives were missing and I was able to gather a 
panel data set of over 22 thousand observations.
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In the bottom half of Table 1, I report mean, median, standard deviation and 
range of other variables. On average, a newspaper reports around 25 unemployment 
articles out of a total of around 3263 articles in a month.
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IV. Results 
Conservative, liberal and moderate newspapers
First, I estimate the following fixed-effects panel regression model to measure the 
effects of a rival newspaper’s closure on the reporting of unemployment news by 
surviving newspapers:
Where RFjt is the relative frequency of unemployment articles for newspaper j in time 
period t,  AfterClosurejt is a binary variable indicating that the observation is in a time 
period after the closure of a rival newspaper, DemocratPresidentt is a binary variable 
indicating that the President is a Democrat, Unemploymentt-1 is the US unemployment 
rate of the previous month, log(TotalArticlesjt) is the natural logarithm of total articles 
for newspaper j in month t. Main variables of interest are AfterClosurejt, 
DemocratPresidentt and their interaction. β3  represents the effect of having a Democrat 
President in office rather than a Republican President, before closure.  β1+β3 represents 
the same effect after closure.
I include an interaction of these two variables in order to allow for different 
closure effects under Democrat and Republican Presidents. I include the unemployment 
rate of the previous month, since this rate is announced in the beginning of current 
month and it is the relevant rate for unemployment articles. Change in unemployment 
rate can also affect reporting of unemployment news, as a sudden increase (or decrease) 
in unemployment rate is likely to attract more media attention. Therefore, I include the 
change in unemployment rate between the two previous months as a control variable. 
Larger newspapers are more likely to have other sections such as sports, arts, foreign 
affairs or celebrity news. This in turn can reduce the relative frequency of 
unemployment articles compared to a smaller newspaper that report only political and 
economic news. I use logarithm of total articles that appear in a newspaper in a month 
as a proxy for newspaper’s size. In addition, I include a time trend in case newspapers 
became more (or less) likely to report unemployment news between 1990 and 2009. 
Finally, there may be factors that affect all newspapers in the same MSA. I use MSA 
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fixed effects in my first specification in order to account for such factors. Furthermore, 
the circulation of a closed rival’s newspaper relative to a surviving newspaper’s 
circulation or the political affiliation of the closed newspaper can have different effects 
on each newspaper. I include newspaper fixed effects in my second specification to 
account for such effects. These two types of fixed effects should produce similar results, 
as only 4 out of 24 MSAs with closures had more than one surviving newspaper.
I divide the newspapers in my sample into three groups, according to their 
endorsement index. -0.18 and 0.19 correspond to 33rd and 67th percentile when I rank all 
newspapers by endorsement index from most conservative to most liberal. From now 
on, I will call newspapers in bottom third, top third and middle third of endorsement 
index “conservative newspapers”, “liberal newspapers” and “moderate newspapers”, 
respectively. Panel A of Table 2a, 3b and 3c reports the estimated regression results. The 
first displays results after controlling for MSA fixed effects, while the second column 
includes newspaper fixed effects. The second specification is my preferred specification, 
as newspaper fixed effects control for more individualized unobserved factors. In Panel 
B of each table, I report the predicted relative frequency of unemployment articles by 
president and closure, based on the estimated coefficients in second specifications.
Table 2a indicates that, for the same unemployment rate and change in 
unemployment rate,  conservative newspapers report unemployment news 0.135 
percentage points more under  a Democrat President than a Republican President, 
before closure. This effect is significant at 1% significance level. If we turn our attention 
to the period after closure, this effect is reduced to 0.028. In Panel B of the same table, 
the predicted relative frequencies indicate that conservative newspapers reported about 
19% more unemployment news under a Democrat President than a Republican 
President, before closure. After closure, this effect was only 3.5%.  This moderation of 
media bias after closure can also be seen for liberal newspapers in Table 2b. Liberal 
newspapers reported 0.105 percentage points more unemployment news under a 
Republican President than a Democratic President, before closure. This effect was 
reduced to 0.006 percentage points after closure. Panel B of the same table indicates 
that liberal newspapers were reporting about 12% more unemployment news under a 
Republican President than a Democrat President. This effect is less than 1% after 
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closure. For moderate newspapers, reported in Table 2c, the estimated coefficients for 
my variables of interest were insignificant. President’s party affiliation did not seem to 
matter for moderate newspapers in their reporting of unemployment news. These 
effects remained insignificant after closure.
For conservative, liberal and moderate newspapers, I test the following two 
hypotheses. The first one tests the null hypothesis of no bias before closure, while the 
second test is for the period after closure.
Hypothesis 1: Ho: β3 = 0 H1: β3 ≠ 0
Hypothesis 2:  Ho: β1+β3 = 0 H1: β1+β3 ≠ 0
For conservative newspapers, p-values for alternative hypotheses were 0 and 
0.42. Null Hypothesis of no bias can be rejected before closure at 1% significance level. 
After closure, we fail to reject that there is no media bias. P-values for the alternative 
hypotheses of liberal newspapers were 0 and 0.84. Null hypothesis of no bias is rejected 
before closure, while it fails to be rejected after closure. For moderate newspapers, both 
null hypotheses fail to be rejected, since the p-values are 0.24 and 0.67. One-tailed tests 
also led to the same conclusions.
A one percentage point increase in unemployment rate increased the reporting of 
unemployment news by around 0.185 percentage points in all three tables. This effect 
was significant. Change in unemployment rate also had a significant positive effect on 
reporting of unemployment news. The size of the newspaper had a negative effect on 
relative frequency of unemployment news, but this effect was not always significant at 
5% level. Time trend was insignificant.
Effects of alignment between newspaper’s and President’s political inclinations 
Second, I create an alignment index which is formed by multiplying a 
newspaper’s endorsement index with -1 if the President is Republican. As noted earlier, 
endorsement index was negative for conservative newspapers and positive for liberal 
newspapers. This way, positive numbers for alignment index will correspond to a 
newspaper in political alignment with the President, while negative numbers will 
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represent the opposite. In addition, the absolute value of this number will be a measure 
of the intensity of alignment or misalignment with the President. This approach will 
allow me to use over 22,000 observations at once and provide a more continuous 
measure of marginal effects of alignment on relative frequency of unemployment news.  
I estimate the following econometric model:
 
Here, Alignmentjt, is the newly calculated alignment index for newspaper j in 
time period t. Table 3 displays the regression results with alignment index. Columns 1 
and 2 include MSA fixed effects and newspaper fixed effects respectively.
The results are significant for all main variables of interest. Before closure, a 
newspaper reported 0.28 percentage points less unemployment news if it was 1 point 
more in alignment with the president. This effect was 0.07 after closure. Alignment 
index range is between -1.2 and 1.2. 25th and 75th percentile of alignment index were 
-0.266 and 0.266, respectively. I call the former “low alignment” and the latter “high 
alignment”. Predicted values of relative frequencies are given in Panel B. As alignment 
increases, unemployment news are reported less. Before closure, this effect is about 
15%, while it is about 5% after closure. Moderation of media bias after the closure of a 
rival newspaper continues to be the case when alignment index is used with over 21,000 
observations. Other control variables also have similar signs and magnitudes as in 
Tables 3a, 3b and 3c.
I test the same Null Hypotheses of no bias before closure and after closure. This 
time, I compare 25th percentile of alignment index with 75th percentile of alignment 
index. I reject the Null Hypothesis of no bias before closure, but fail to reject it after 
closure.
Effects of closures by population of the MSA
Third, I consider the population of the Metropolitan Statistical Area in order to 
analyze whether the newspapers in more populated areas behaved differently after 
closure than the newspapers in less populated areas. Highly populated areas are more 
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likely to have a higher number of newspapers . One rival’s closure may not have as large 
of an effect as in smaller areas, since there will still be more surviving rivals. To capture 
this effect, I divide the sample into two according to MSA population in 2000 Census. I 
call the first half “low population areas” and the second half “high population areas”. 
I run the previous regression with alignment index. Regressions results are 
reported in Table 4. I only include my preferred specification of newspaper fixed effects, 
as the other specification has produced similar results. First column of Panel A reports 
the results for low population areas, while the second column is for high population 
areas.
Regression results indicate that alignment’s effect is larger in smaller 
metropolitan areas. Panel B displays the percentage change of relative frequency of 
unemployment articles by population and closure, as we increase the alignment index 
from 25th percentile to 75th percentile. Newspapers in low population areas had a larger 
reduction (from 16.3% to 4.3%) in their bias than newspapers in high population areas 
(from 13.5% to 5.8%). This may be attributed to the fact that in many small areas, the 
surviving newspaper was the only newspaper left and it moderated its media bias more 
to reach out to former readers of the closed newspaper. In large areas, there would still 
be competition after a closure and the benefits from moderation would be relatively less.
Robustness
I use newspaper slant, measured by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), instead of 
endorsement index in order to see if this would change my results. Newspaper slant was 
available for 3 additional newspapers for a total of 102 newspapers.
Table 5 displays the results of my first regression. Columns 1 and 3 reproduce the 
results from Tables 3a and 3b, for conservative and liberal newspapers, respectively. 
These results used the endorsement index to divide the sample into three groups. I 
report the results with newspaper slant in columns 2 and 4, for conservative and liberal 
newspapers, respectively.
The results were very similar. The numbers have the same signs and significance. 
This is plausible, as endorsement index and newspaper slant were highly correlated. 
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There is no evidence that the classification of newspapers by endorsement index or 
newspaper slant is driving the results.
Potential for Selection Bias
Newspapers in closure markets might have been already reporting 
unemployment news more (or less) often than the newspapers in markets without a 
closure, before the closure date. If this is the case, then the regression results would be 
biased. My AfterClosure variable takes the value 0 for both observations in markets 
without closure and for observations before closure date in markets with closure. These 
two sets of observations construct my control  group. In Table 6, I compare these two 
sets of observations by relative frequency of unemployment articles and MSA population 
in 2000. Relative frequencies of unemployment articles are 0.849 and 0.818, in closure 
markets before closure and in markets without closure, respectively. The difference 
between the two numbers is statistically insignificant at 1% significance level. Average 
MSA population of the two sets of observations were also very close and the difference 
between them was statistically insignificant at 1% level. I was not able to find evidence 
for selection bias before the closure.
Potential for Omitted Variable Bias
Ideally, I would also control for the ratio of closed newspaper’s circulation to 
surviving newspaper’s circulation in the same area. Larger closed newspaper are more 
likely to have greater effects on surviving newspapers with their closure. Ideal time to 
observe such circulation numbers would be just before the closure date, for both closed 
and surviving newspapers. However, my search for historical circulation numbers 
provided data for less than one third of surviving newspapers and less than 10% of 
closed newspapers. However, newspaper fixed effects would account for this missing 
variable, since every newspaper has a fixed effect that account for such a ratio among 
other factors that do not vary over time for a newspaper.
Furthermore, closed newspapers’ endorsement index was also not available for 
almost all closed newspapers. If the closed newspaper was of the opposing political view 
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in a market, a stronger case can be made for further moderation of media bias in such 
markets. Nevertheless, newspaper fixed effects would also capture such an effect. 
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V. Conclusions
This research shows that newspapers moderate their media-bias significantly 
after the closure of a rival newspaper in the same market. After controlling for the 
unemployment rate and change in unemployment rate, conservative newspapers 
reported 19% more unemployment news when the President was a Democrat rather 
than a Republican, before the closure of a rival newspaper in the same media market. 
This effect is 12% for liberal newspapers. After the closure, these numbers were 3.5% 
and 1%, respectively. In addition, newspapers in smaller metropolitan areas, where the 
effect of a closure on the set of potential readers is conceivably larger,  moderate their 
bias more. 
My identification strategy can potentially have a selection bias or omitted 
variable bias. Newspapers in closure markets may already display more (or less) media 
bias than newspapers in other markets, even before the closure of a rival newspaper. 
This would bias the regression results. I compare the reporting of unemployment news 
before the closure in closure markets and in markets that never had a closure. I find no 
evidence for selection bias. Ideally, I would also have the ratio of a closed newspaper’s 
circulation to that of each surviving newspaper of the same media market, just before 
the closure. Closed newspapers with high circulation are more likely to affect the 
behavior of surviving newspapers. However, my search of historical circulation numbers 
did not provide data for majority of closed or surviving newspapers. Furthermore, I 
would ideally have the endorsement index of closed newspapers, but this was not 
available either. A remedy to such omitted variable bias is provided by the nature of 
panel data. I include newspaper-fixed effects in order to account for such factors.
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My findings provide support for demand-driven media bias, as newspapers aim 
to increase their revenues by gaining the former readers of a closed newspaper. These 
estimates are robust to an alternative classification of newspaper’s political affiliation. It 
would appear that, then, newspaper editors or owners do not have as much influence on 
the agenda-setting behavior of newspapers as the readers. Their influence is more likely 
to be constrained in the editorial opinion columns and endorsement decisions, rather 
than the news articles. 
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 Figure 1: Frequency of Newspapers by Endorsement Index
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Figure 2: Relative Frequency of Newspapers by Unemployment Rate
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Figure 3: Relative Frequency of Newspapers by Change in Unemployment Rate
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CHAPTER 2 :
ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST AND ISSUE STANCES IN US ELECTIONS† 
                            Cagdas Agirdas*  and Adam Stevenson**
I. Introduction
On April 7th, 2008, while speaking at a San Francisco fund-raiser, presidential 
candidate Barack Obama addressed the attitudes of working-class Pennsylvanians after 
25 years of diminishing job prospects, saying that “…it's not surprising then they get 
bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who are not like them or 
anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their 
frustrations”. For most of the last century, the Democratic Party has tended to support 
more generous unemployment benefits and more redistributive taxation than the 
Republican Party, and so it is generally taken as given that it is in the economic self-
interest of the poor to vote for Democratic candidates (this will be our definition of 
economic self-interest throughout the paper). The argument that lower-income 
Americans are increasingly voting based on non-economic issues and against their 
economic self-interest is not new. Thomas Frank’s (2004) What’s the Matter with 
Kansas claims that white working-class voters began to abandon the Democratic Party 
in the 1970s, voting increasingly more Republican due to their positions on “social” 
issues, such as the right to bear arms, abortion or same-sex marriage. The claim that 
many poor voters vote against their economic self-interest is common in the popular 
media as well (Castello 2007).
A number of political scientists have responded to Frank’s analysis. Gelman et al. 
(2007) for example find that the poor consistently vote more Democratic than the rich 
†  Acknowledgements: Thanks are due to Prof. Mattias Polborn and Prof. Dan Bernhardt. The 
usual caveats apply.
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in their own state, but this gradient varies negatively with average state income.  Each of 
these studies focus, as does Frank, on presidential elections5.  Presidential elections may 
however, be a special case.  Even if these studies refute the main argument of What’s the 
Matter with Kansas, Frank could be correct when other elections are considered.  
We ask whether economically self-interested voting is the rule across U.S. House, 
Senate, presidential and gubernatorial elections, or whether the presidential election is 
exceptional in this regard.  While most papers that study the effect of income on voting 
behavior assume that only the absolute level of income affects voting behavior, we allow 
income to influence voting according to both absolute income levels and relative (within 
congressional district) income6.  Gelman (2009) implicitly assumes that citizens vary in 
their voting behavior across income levels within their own state (which have varying 
average income levels). In this paper, we assume that voters evaluate their income level 
relative to their congressional district (CD) average, which is generally a much smaller 
“peer group” that the state-level effect. Given a common effect of CD-level income, we 
allow personal income levels to flexibly influence voter preferences for one party over 
another across elections for each office type.
Frank’s main hypothesis is that “hot-button” social issues are increasingly the 
driver of voting patterns. The influence of social issues run contrary to economic self-
interest among the poor and in traditionally Republican states, so the argument goes, 
implying that rational voters are harming themselves by voting for Republican 
candidates. Bartels (2006) rejects a number of hypotheses about the differences in the 
influence of social issues by “social class” over time. Again, he focuses on national effects 
(rather than identifying the state or CD-level context), and he looks only at presidential 
voting. In this paper, we consider whether voter positions on non-economic issues 
5 This is for a number of reasons across offices. Voting in congressional elections are perceived by political 
scientists as largely being dominated by incumbency and spending effects, or matters of simple recognition 
(Jacobsen 2004). Governors maybe seen as not particularly powerful or influential, or perhaps the influences on 
voting are seen as being too idiosyncratic across states – we are not aware of any systematic discussion of these 
issues. Perceived lack of data may also be an issue at the gubernatorial level.
6 If voters evaluate their position in the income distribution relative to those around them, then not only is the 
income of the voter salient to voting behavior, but so is its interaction with the income in the area in which she 
lives. For a discussion of how and whether relative income affects economic behavior, see Stevenson and Wolfers 
(2008), Kahneman et al. (2006).
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attenuate the effect of income on partisan voting relative to the voter’s geographical 
context, across office and time.
A number of well-documented influences on voting behavior are correlated with 
either income or partisan voting and they have largely been omitted from studies of 
economically self-interested voting. Such characteristics include candidate incumbency, 
the voter’s race, gender, age, education level and the characteristics of the voter’s place 
of residence. These studies focused on presidential elections, where incumbency was 
irrelevant once year fixed effects are included. The usage of aggregate vote counts, 
rather than microdata at voter level, made it impossible to analyze the correlation 
between voter characteristics and the vote.  In addition, there is a long literature on the 
effects of campaign spending on election results (see Jacobson (1978, 1980, 1985, 1990), 
Abramowitz (1988), Gerber (1998)). For challenger spending, these effects are large, 
robust, and, again, typically omitted from studies of the effects of income on voting. We 
must control for these variables before we draw conclusions about economically self-
interested voting.
After controlling for the relevant observed variables plus the effect of 
idiosyncratic and unobserved contest-level partisan shocks, we find that economically 
self-interested voting prevails across all offices we consider. This difference in partisan 
voting across income exists within poor and average-income districts. In the wealthiest 
districts, such a difference exists only in presidential elections. Once we control for issue 
stances of the voters, economically self-interested voting exists only in presidential 
elections, and only in poor and average-income districts.
We also analyze the dynamics of our results, interacting voter income and issue 
stances with time. We find evidence for economically self-interested voting in 
presidential elections of 1990s and 2000s, in all districts but wealthy districts. Over the 
course of our sample, self-interested voting according to income appears to be a 
phenomenon of the 1990s and 2000s. There is little evidence of economically self-
interested voting at the beginning of our sample (the late 1970s and 1980s), coinciding 
with the well-known lull in partisan voting of the 1970s.
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The Presidential election really is a special thing in the American political system. 
While the federal Congress and state-level politicians like the governor (arguably) have 
much more control over the economic well-being of voters, voters appear to largely 
ignore so-called economic self-interest in voting for these politicians. The inclusion of 
issue positions into our models of voting behavior in these races makes both absolute 
and relative income completely non-predictive of voting behavior. This is largely as 
Frank would argue, had he focused on these offices, and it is in line with a relatively 
rational, well-informed voter. “Social” concerns like abortion and gun control policies 
are largely determined at the state level. Income is a very powerful influence over 
Presidential voting, as other researchers have clearly shown, and in contradiction to 
Frank and other popular commentators. To the extent that social scientists want to 
study the tradeoff between economic and social forces in the political economy, they 
should focus on these other offices, rather than on the focal race of the Presidency, 
where the tradeoff is less stark, where the policy is actually formed and fought, and 
where the data largely fails to support the idea of the (relatively) misguided and ill-
informed voting.
34
II. Data
The majority of our variables come from the American National Election Surveys 
(NES)7. The NES conducts a survey of voting-age adults every election year. This data 
includes the individual’s self-reported voting for Senate, House, presidential and 
gubernatorial races, income, self-reported ideology, age, minority status, gender, 
education level, level of urbanization and positions on various issues. We use the NES 
surveys conducted from 1978 to 2004, with the exception of 2002, since the 
respondents were not asked to report their income in 2002. We exclude the elections 
before 1978, as campaign spending data was not available for those years. Our unit of 
observation is a single individual’s (i) vote cast over the candidates for a specific office 
(o) in a given year (t)8.
We use Federal Election Commission (FEC)9 data for federal campaign spending. 
Since gubernatorial elections are not federal, this campaign spending is disclosed to the 
relevant state government agencies, and has been collected in the Gubernatorial 
Campaign Expenditures Database (GCED)10. Our incumbency data come from the FEC 
and GCED as well. CD-level characteristics, (most importantly, the median income of 
the voter’s CD) are taken from nearest US Census11 for years up through 2000 and from 
the American Communities Survey (ACS) for 2004.
We drop votes cast for House candidates in the year immediately after 
redistricting (if any), since the partisan dynamics in these years are likely to be 
substantially different than those in other years. We also drop votes cast in elections 
without real competition between one republican and one democrat. These cases 
7 Data and documentation is available from the NES website, http://www.electionstudies.org
8 The NES is generally a repeated cross-section, but a small number of individuals are observed in multiple years. 
Our notation makes this clear, but we do not use the partial panel structure of the NES in this paper.
9 Data and documentation is available from the FEC website, http://www.fec.gov
10 GCED was compiled by Thad Beyle and Jennifer M. Jensen, with assistance from Rachelle Fernandes and Jenny Li. 
Data and documentation is available at http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/guber.html 
11 Census data for congressional districts was compiled by E. Scott Adler. Data and documentation is available at 
http://sobek.colorado.edu/~esadler/districtdatawebsite/CongressionalDistrictDatasetwebpage.htm
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include elections that had strong third party candidates or more than one strong 
candidate of the same party12.
Table 7 provides the descriptive statistics of the major variables that we use in 
this paper, for the population of voters. We had more than 5,300 voters surveyed in 
each of House, Senate and presidential elections, while gubernatorial elections had 
about 3,600 respondents. In our sample, around 11% of the votes were cast by the poor, 
while about 7% of the votes came from the rich. We weight our regressions so that the 
results better approximate the population of voters.
12 Louisiana has a nonpartisan blanket primary in which the candidates from both parties run against each other in 
one single primary. If no candidate obtains a majority of the vote, then the two strongest candidates advance to 
the runoff election. In many cases, this resulted in candidates of the same party competing against each other in 
the runoff election.
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III. Econometric Models and Variables
Since we are interested in finding evidence for economically self-interested voting 
across the four offices, we look for significant differences in the likelihood of voting 
Republican between the rich and the poor in each. The estimated models and the 
variables we include are given below.
Our base model, Model 1a, is given by:
itodtotodtooitoitoito ZXIR εϕηλγβ +++++== )1Pr( . (1)
Rito takes a value of one when voter i reported casting a vote for the Republican 
candidate for office o in year t.  The main variables of interest, the income effects, Iit, 
include a vector of income category dummy variables13 and their interaction with the 
(continuously measured) median income of their congressional district. We call this 
interaction “relative income”. As one holds individual income constant and raise CD 
income, the individual becomes poorer relative to her neighbors. If relative income 
influences voting and the poor are more likely to vote for Democratic candidates, then 
we expect the coefficient associated with relative income to be negative. Xit is a vector of 
other voter characteristics, such as self-reported ideology14, age, minority status, and 
whether the voter is female.
There is an endogeneity problem in the previous literature, where party affiliation 
is used to predict the vote cast (see Ansolabehere et al. (2006)). Party affiliation of the 
voter is likely to be simultaneously determined with the vote cast by that voter. Namely, 
it is not clear which way the causality runs between party affiliation and the vote cast. To 
mitigate this problem, we use self-reported ideology of the voter instead of party 
affiliation. 
13 The NES data restricts us to using income categories rather than a continuous variable.   Incomes are grouped by 
annual income centiles, so that while in absolute terms the categories differ across years, in relative terms they are 
comparable.  We label these five categories poor (0-16th percentile), low-middle  (17th - 33rd percentile), middle 
(34th-67th percentile), high-middle  (68th – 95th percentile) and rich (96th – 100th percentile).
14 Self-reported ideology is measured on a scale of 1-7, 1 being “extremely liberal”, 7 “extremely conservative”, and 
4 “moderate/non-ideological”
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Contest-specific characteristics are given by Zdto, where d stands for district.  The 
main characteristics we control for are Republican relative spending15 (the Republican’s 
share of all expenditures in the dto campaign), and whether the incumbent ran for the 
office, an effect we allow to differ between Republicans and Democrats.  We also allow 
for national partisan shocks by office in each election year in the form of year fixed 
effects ηto. Since the NES in most cases contains data on multiple votes cast for each 
race, we can control for idiosyncratic partisan shocks to each contested election, in the 
form of race-specific dummy variables, φdto. These latter effects may arise in the form of 
scandals, differences in candidate valence, or any other effects that sway voters but that 
are unobserved by the econometrician.  Finally, we assume that the residual effect εito is 
normally distributed, so that we may estimate equation (1) by probit regression.
As a sensitivity analysis, we analyze the robustness of Model 1 to the presence of 
possible confounding variables. Model 1b is identical to equation (1) except that Xit  
includes the voter’s education level in the form of three binary variables indicating that 
voter had 0 to 8 years of education, 13 to 15 years of education and a college degree or 
more (9 to 12 years in the omitted category). Model 1c is identical to model 1b, except 
that Xit contains also the level of urbanization of the voter’s congressional district (CD) 
in the form of two binary variables identifying city and rural voters (suburban residency 
in the omitted category). One concern here is that higher education may influence 
political views, and the rich are more likely to be highly educated than the poor. Further, 
both the rich and the well-educated are disproportionally likely to live in urban area, 
and it is well known that residents of urban areas are more likely to vote for a Democrat 
(Gelman 2009).
Our main focus is the interaction between the social issue positions and economic 
self-interest of voters, and so in model 2, we add six issue variables to model 1c to see 
whether voter responses to these issues attenuate or mitigate the effect of income on 
15 Where sR (sD) is the total spending of the Republican (Democratic) candidate in campaign dto, this variable equals 
sR/( sR.+ sD). In the presidential elections within our sample (between 1980 and 2004, both major party candidates 
accepted public financing. Therefore, they had the same amount of money to spend after the conventions, which 
eliminated any potential financial advantages in campaigning. For this reason, we do not include a spending 
variable in presidential elections.
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partisan voting. We divide our issue variables into three that are predominantly 
“economic” and three that are predominantly “social”. Each issue is measured on its 
own integer-valued scale (indicated in Table 2), where in each case we have constructed 
the variable so that higher numbers coincide with the more “conservative” position.
A secondary claim of Frank’s is the alleged phenomenon that poor citizens grew 
substantially in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in rural and inland states. To observe 
how income and social issue effects have changed over time, in model 3 we interact all 
income variables and issue variables from model 2 with a time trend variable and its 
square.
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IV. Absolute and Relative Income Effects on Partisan Voting
There can be no doubt that the rich are more likely to vote for a Republican 
candidate than the poor (regardless of whether it is true that the poor tend to vote 
against their “economic self-interest”). Figure 4 shows the simple mean of partisan 
voting behavior (where 1 implies a vote cast for a Republican, 0 for a Democrat) across 
the deciles of CD median income, plotted by personal income categories. For example, 
middle-income voters in a median-income district voted for the Republican candidate 
for a House seat around 40% of the time in our data. There is clear partisan 
stratification by income in elections for all offices. In the raw data, there seems to be 
some indication that among rich individuals, the likelihood of voting Republican falls as 
CD income rises. The opposite appears to be true among the poor; the “poor” line slope 
up slightly, implying that as the poor become relatively poorer within district, they 
become more likely to vote for the Republican candidate. In Senate and presidential 
elections, in the poorest districts, there is a fifty percentage point difference in 
Republican voting between the rich and the poor, while in the richest districts, that gap 
falls to around twenty percentage points. This section investigates first whether the 
existence of these absolute income gaps are robust to the presence of control variables, 
and second, whether this “closing” of the relative income gap in rich districts is a 
significant relationship within the data.
Table 8 reports the results of our base model, model 1a, as well as the sensitivity 
analyses of models 1b and 1c. The omitted income category corresponds to individuals 
between the 34th - 67th percentiles of income. In every regression presented in this paper, 
we control for, but do not report the associated coefficients of voter characteristics that 
consist of self-reported ideology, age, minority status and whether the voter was female. 
For all offices, in all versions of model 1, self-reported ideology and minority status have 
significant effect in the expected direction, and voter gender never does. Age has a small 
but significant effect in House and Senate, (where older voters are slightly more 
Democratic), while it had no significant effects in gubernatorial and presidential 
elections.
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The main effects of interest in Table 2 are the absolute and relative income 
coefficients. Since we define economic self-interest in voting to exist when the rich and 
the poor, all else equal, we are not directly interested in whether particular income 
coefficients (whether relative or absolute) are significantly different from zero, since 
these simply test whether the coefficients differ from those of middle-income voters. We 
primarily want to investigate whether the total effect of income causes the rich and poor 
to vote significantly differently, which involves a different test, performed below. That 
said, it is also informative to look at individual coefficients. Consider model 1a in Table 
2. Holding all else (including CD income) equal, individuals in the poor or low-middle 
income groups do not vote significantly more or less Republican than middle-income 
voters. Individuals in the top two income categories vote significantly more Republican 
in House and presidential elections than do middle income voters, and where 
significant, the relative income effects have the expected sign. When we perform our test 
of economically self-interested voting, it will become important to note that, except in 
House elections, the relative income coefficients for the poor, while not individually 
significantly different from zero, are actually positive. Interestingly, the income of the 
CD overall is not significantly correlated with voting; it is only through the relative 
effects that district income sways voting behavior.
To directly test the existence of economically self-interested voting, we must 
control for the electoral context. First, as our specification suggests, we provide separate 
tests by office type. We also consider how income differences in partisan voting change 
with the income level of the CD. Our mental experiment goes as follows. We take a poor 
and rich voter (with all other characteristics set at the sample mean), and place them 
together into various electoral contexts: into a poor district (in the 10th percentile of CD 
median income), a median-income district, and a rich (90th CD income percentile) 
district. In each case, find the expected partisan gap in voting, and test whether this gap 
is statistically significant. We perform a similar test where we assign them to income-
typical districts, where the poor and rich individuals are assigned to a CD with the 
expected income for someone in their individual income group. In this situation, the 
rich and poor voters are in different districts, but otherwise we compare voters within 
the same district. Let the total effect of income level I on voting behavior be 
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)(* incomemedianCDII βα + , where Iα is the absolute income effect, and Iβ is the 
relative income effect. The null hypothesis that we test for an average-income CD is
H0 : 0)802.20*()802.20*( =+−+ richrichpoorpoor βαβα (2)
with analogous specifications for other CD income levels. Table 3 reports the 
teststatistics, based on the model 1a results, by office and CD income. All the test 
statistics are negative, as expected. The poor are more likely to vote for a Democrat than 
the rich. Second, there is significant economically self-interested voting for every office 
within average, poor and income-typical districts. In rich districts, there is only evidence 
for economically self-interested voting in presidential elections. In poor districts, the 
poor ‘vote poor’: they follow their perceived self-interest and vote more democratic. 
However, in rich districts, there is no significant partisan difference. Even though they 
are relatively poorer, they ‘vote rich’, as if they share the electoral values of their rich 
neighbors.  Finally, economically self-interested voting seems to have the greatest effect 
in presidential elections, which have been the focus in the literature. Voters seem to 
believe that the President has more power over redistributing income through tax policy 
than a single representative, senator or governor. The inclusion of relative income 
effects is an important addition here. Standard economic assumptions (and most 
empirical research that we are aware of) would lead us to believe that the poor, for 
example, are homogenous in the way they vote for their own economic well-being. In 
fact, the poor (on an absolute scale) in rich districts vote differently than the poor in rich 
districts. A naïve version of model 1a that only includes absolute income levels16 
systematically overestimates partisan income differences in rich districts and 
underestimates differences in voting behavior in poor districts.
               The results of models 1b and 1c, also given in Table 8, test the sensitivity of the 
estimated income effects in model 1a to the inclusion of plausible confounding variables 
in the relationship between income and partisan voting. More educated voters are more 
likely to vote Republican, and college dropouts tend to be more Republican than others. 
Adding urbanization indicators (omitting the category of predominantly suburban 
districts), voters in rural areas are significantly more likely to vote Republican, and 
16 These results are available upon request.
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urban voters are more likely to vote Democratic in Senate and presidential elections. 
The inclusion of these variables do not significantly change the absolute and relative 
income coefficients, nor do they noticeably augment the explanatory power of our 
regressions, given income and our large number of fixed effects. The tests reported in 
Table 9 do not change significantly under models 1b and 1c.
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V. Partisan Income Effects, Given Issue Positions, and Across Time
In Model 2, we include voter responses to the three economic and three social 
issues we introduced in the previous section. In contrast to Bartels (2006), we look 
beyond presidential elections (in addition to including controls given in equation (1). 
The results are given in Table 10. The explanatory power (as measured by a likelihood-
ratio test between models 1c and 2) of the model is sharply improved when we include 
issue positions. The absolute and relative income coefficients do not change significantly 
relative to model 1a. The three economic issues have stronger association with voting 
than the three social issues. Therefore, we had no evidence to claim that social issues 
matter more than economic issues in voting. Among economic issues, the voter’s 
opinion about the government provision of jobs is most consistently associated with 
partisan voting, while abortion leads among social issues. The coefficients on issue 
positions are greater in Presidential elections than in any other elections. This might 
again be due to the fact that a president can have a stronger impact on these issues than 
a single representative, senator or governor.
We perform a test, analogous to equation (2) based on the model 2 results, where 
we now maintain issue positions at their sample means. These results are given in Table 
11. Once we control for differences in issue positions across income categories, income 
differences in partisan voting tend to fall into insignificance in House, Senate and 
gubernatorial elections, and significantly, economically self-interested voting remains 
only in presidential elections. Presidential elections appear unique in this regard, and 
the evidence supports Frank for all other offices. While issue positions are important to 
presidential voters, both income and issues exert powerful influence over voting. For the 
other offices (and particularly so for the House), issue positions largely dominate 
income as an influence over voting.
We summarize these results visually in Figure 5, which plots rich-poor 
differences in Republican voting, given various levels of controls. Each line is the result 
of a prediction based on model 2. The line labeled “raw difference” simply generates 
predicted voting for each individual based on these results and averages across personal 
income by CD income categories. The “basic controls” adjustment generates individual 
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predictions, on the assumption that all dtoZ and itX  variables except issue positions are 
set to their population means. This controls for systematic differences in these 
characteristics by income. The “full controls” does the same while equalizing issue 
positions across income as well. Moving from raw predicted differences to the full 
control line pushes income effects towards zero in every office. Only in Presidential 
elections do these rich-poor differences remain positive, although the gap does shrink as 
we add controls.
In Figure 6, we plot the rich-poor income effect as measured by the difference in 
the sums of the absolute and relative income coefficients. For this calculation, CD 
median income is measured at the intra-decile mean. The “basic control” coefficients are 
taken from model 1c while the “full control” coefficients are from model 2. We also 
display the 95% confidence intervals of each income effect estimate. This difference 
approaches zero as the district median income increases in every office. With minimal 
controls, the rich-poor difference is significant in poor districts, while it disappears into 
insignificance as we move to the wealthiest districts for all offices except the presidency.
Frank’s essential story is that the phenomenon of issue-driven voting has grown 
over time, to become a powerful electoral influence by the time of the “Republican 
Revolution” in 1994. To examine the time dynamics of the effects presented in Table 10, 
we now turn our attention to time interactions of income and issue variables. Model 3 
allows the parameters associated with income groups, relative income effects and issue 
positions to vary flexibly with time. We set the time variable to take value 0 in 1978 
elections and to increase by 1 for each election year thereafter, so that the presidential 
election year of 1980 is the “base” year in our analysis. The results are shown in Table 
12. 
In Table 13, we report the test results for economically self-interested voting in 
three years: 1978, 1990 and 2000. We reject the hypothesis of a rich-poor gap in 
partisan voting (all else, including issue positions, equal) for any office or district type in 
1978. Frank’s idea that voters began voting against their economic-self interest starting 
in 1970s seems to find support in our findings for 1978. The 1990s were a high-point for 
economically stratified partisan voting in the House. In relatively poor districts, we find 
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significant differences in voting by income, but this effect disappears by 2000, and it 
never approaches the magnitude of the income effect in presidential elections. 
Economically self-interested voting appears to rise consistently in Senate and 
presidential elections over our sample period, becoming significant and very large in 
Senate races (among all median district income levels) by the year 2000, and significant 
and increasingly large in the presidential races of the 1990s and 2000s. The income 
dynamics of gubernatorial races are substantially different. We never find any evidence 
of income differences in partisan voting.
It bears repeating that the only income effects that we find in House and 
presidential races come from low-income and average districts. As we discussed in the 
context of Table 10, the poor in relatively rich districts “vote rich”, as if their political 
self-interest is more aligned with the rich in their district than with the poor in other 
districts. Table 13 makes it clear that this effect is not common, since there is only one 
instance in 12 tests of significant differences in income-based voting among rich 
districts. This phenomenon is actually increasing in presidential races, to the point that 
the test statistic is almost zero among presidential voters in 2000.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic House Senate Governor President
Total votes cast 6309 5662 3658 5354
Number of election years 13 13 7 7
Total electoral races 731 234 141 7
Average number of votes per election year 485 435 523 765
Fraction of votes cast for Republicans 46.28% 46.49% 44.92% 49.64%
(0.499) (0.499) (0.497) (0.500)
Average number of CDs surveyed per election year 56 78 87 131
(14.64) (35.06) (37.86) (53.04)
Fraction of races with a Republican incumbent 36.39% 36.32% 22.69% NA
(0.481) (0.482) (0.420) NA
Races with a Democratic incumbent 49.25% 41.03% 22.69% NA
(0.500) (0.493) (0.420) NA
Fraction of Republican spending 45.64% 52.04% 48.06% NA
(0.343) (0.259) (0.207) NA
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Table 7 (cont.)
Median of CD Median Incomes 20,209 19,980 19,980 20,499
(6,732) (7,557) (6,526) (7,632)
% of votes cast by the poor voters 10.40% 10.84% 11.21% 11.38%
(0.305) (0.311) (0.316) (0.318)
% of votes cast by the low-middle income voters 14.93% 14.82% 15% 15.74%
(0.356) (0.355) (0.357) (0.364)
% of votes cast by the middle income voters 35.03% 33.82% 33.16% 34.32%
(0.477) (0.473) (0.471) (0.475)
% of votes cast by the high-middle income voters 32.78% 32.96% 32.45% 31.86%
(0.469) (0.470) (0.468) (0.466)
% of votes cast by the rich voters 6.91% 7.56% 8.20% 6.69%
(0.254) (0.264) (0.274) (0.250)
“Government should leave us alone to get ahead” (1-7) 0.585 0.579 0.58 0.576
(0.269) (0.277) (0.279) (0.278)
“Government will not do what’s right” (1-4) 0.54 0.542 0.553 0.532
(0.185) (0.187) (0.185) (0.187)
“Government wastes our money” (1-3) 0.84 0.827 0.849 0.83
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Table 7 (cont.)
(0.247) (0.252) (0.245) (0.253)
“A woman's place is the home” (1-7) 0.259 0.245 0.274 0.269
(0.292) (0.288) (0.301) (0.298)
“I attend church regularly” (1-6) 0.617 0.615 0.622 0.615
(0.326) (0.325) (0.324) (0.321)
“Abortion should never be legal” (1-4) 0.383 0.369 0.375 0.375
 (0.352) (0.352) (0.352) (0.354)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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                                             Table 9: Test results using Model 1a
House Senate Governor President
Poor district 0.517** 0.428** -0.615** -0.799**
Average district 0.386** 0.347** -0.464** -0.644**
Rich district -0.236 -0.248 -0.3 -0.453**
Income-typical district 0.284** 0.346** -0.467** -0.614**
* indicates p<0.05, ** indicates p<0.01
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Table 11: Test results using Model 2
 House Senate Governor President
Average district -0.223 -0.254* -0.269 -0.458**
Rich district -0.128 -0.29 -0.1 -0.262
Poor district -0.308 -0.224 -0.424* -0.618**
Income-typical district -0.106 -0.234* -0.242 -0.420**
* indicates p<0.05, ** indicates p<0.01
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CHAPTER 3:
IS NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING EFFECTIVE?  
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATES OF U.S. SENATE ELECTIONS 
1998-2008† 
I. Introduction
Negative campaigning is widely used by candidates, especially in televised 
advertising. Finkel and Geer ( 1998) developed a measure of campaign tone in 
Presidential Elections by subtracting percentage of negative TV ads from the percentage 
of positive TV ads. This number went down from 36.1 to 0.8 between 1976 and 1992. 
Main reason for this increase is the belief among candidates and campaign strategists 
that negative campaigning is more effective than positive campaigning, in which 
candidates only talk about their own accomplishments, rather than criticizing their 
opponent. However, if one examines political science literature, effectiveness of negative 
campaigning seems to be a myth. Most literature on negative campaigning focuses on its 
effects on political efficacy and turnout. Ansolabehere et al. (1994) claims that political 
advertising significantly depresses turnout. On the other hand, Kahn and Kenney 
(1999), among other papers, find that negative advertising actually mobilizes the 
electorate and increases turnout. These studies use experimental studies of focus groups 
and they do not study how negative campaigning affects the vote for the sponsor and the 
target of the TV advertisement. They also do not distinguish between two major types of 
negative campaigning: negative issue ads and negative trait ads (personal attacks).
Main reason that most studies choose experimental methods over aggregate-level 
data is the endogeneity problem in regressions of election outcomes on campaign 
negativity. Candidates decide to “go negative” based on their expectations of the election 
outcome. Challengers who are significantly behind in the polls and incumbents who face 
a strong challenger decide to resort to negative campaigning. For this reason, an 
instrumental variables approach would be appropriate in analyzing the effectiveness of 
negative campaigning. Besides choosing the frequency of negative TV ads, candidates 
†  Acknowledgements: I would like to thank  Hassan Arvin-Rad, Werner Baer, Stefan Krasa and Mattias 
Polborn for their comments and encouragement. As usual, I am responsible for any errors.
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also have choice on attacking their opponents based on issue positions or on their 
personality traits. Therefore, it is important to factor this choice into an analysis of the 
effectiveness of negative campaigning. 
I ask whether the frequency and content of negative campaigning significantly 
affects the vote percentages of the sponsor and the target of the TV ad. I collect a data 
set of 162 U.S. Senate Elections in which there was an opposed incumbent. For each of 
the two candidates of an election, I watched TV ads and coded each ad as “positive ad”, 
“negative issue ad” or “negative trait ad”. In order to address the endogeneity problem, I 
use two instruments for negativity of the incumbent and the challenger. These 
instruments are the projected closeness of the election two months before the election 
day and binary variables for Mid-Atlantic and Northeast States. I found these variables 
to be correlated with campaign negativity and they would not affect the election results 
other than their effect on campaign negativity.
Polborn and Yi (2006) develops a theoretical model of informative campaigning. 
They derive the equilibrium of the model and compare it to stylized facts of negative 
campaigning. Their models explains why the electorate’s opinion about the sponsor of a 
negative ad can decrease and why it is possible that the electorate’s opinion about the 
target may increase. Lau et al. (1999) surveys negative campaigning literature. They 
analyze 52 papers on negative campaigning. Only 10 of these papers analyze the effects 
on negative campaigning on voting and only 2 of these 10 papers did not use 
experimental methods. In experiments, researchers typically use undergraduate 
students. Although experiments allow for a tighter control of the campaign message and 
exposure to the message, they may have little to say about actual elections. This is 
because, voter behavior may be different in an experimental setting than in actual 
elections. Furthermore, participants of these experiments are not usually representative 
of the population at large. Lau and Pomper (2002) use aggregate-level data and address 
endogeneity problem in 143 U.S. Senate Elections between 1988 and 1998. They find 
that negative campaigning is more effective for challengers, while positive campaigning 
is more effective for incumbents. However, they do not distinguish between negative 
issue ads and negative trait ads.
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I use an aggregate-level data, rather than an experiment. Using 2SLS approach 
and distinguishing between negative issue ads  and negative trait ads, I find that 
negative campaigning by a challenger significantly decreases the vote for the incumbent. 
However, if the challenger resorts to negative trait ads, her own vote decreases, rather 
than incumbent’s. I do not find any significant effects of negative issue campaigning by 
an incumbent, but negative trait ads by an incumbent significantly reduces her own 
vote. However, these effects are not large enough to change the election outcome of a 
lopsided election.  In competitive elections, I find that negative campaigning can change 
the winner of the election. To my knowledge, this is the only paper that addresses 
endogeneity of negative campaigning and distinguishes issue ads from trait ads at the 
same time. In addition, this paper contributes to the very limited literature on 
effectiveness of negative campaigning, as most negative campaigning literature focuses 
on turnout.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section II explains my data set. In Section 
III, I discuss my empirical strategy and report the main results. Section IV concludes.
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II. Data
Negativity and Personal Attacks
University of Stanford Political Communication Lab, EASE History Campaign Ad 
Archive and Youtube provide online videos of TV ads by Senate candidates. By watching 
these 30-second ads, I coded the percentage of ads that were negative for each candidate 
and the percentage of negative ads that were trait ads. I included only the TV ads that 
were broadcast during the two months preceding the election. Advantage of using three 
different websites is that number of missed ads are minimized.
Incumbent’s vote, Challenger’s previous office
I obtained a list of all Senate elections in 6 election years from 1998 to 2008 from 
Wikipedia. Only elections in which there were an incumbent and a challenger were 
included. Vote percentages of the incumbent and the challenger are also given on the 
same website. I converted these percentages to two-party vote percentage, as in some 
elections, third party candidates received votes. Wikipedia also has a separate page for 
each Senate election, where challenger’s previous jobs can be found. I recorded four 
dummy variables indicating that the challenger has been a Governor, a House member, 
a major office holder and a minor office holder respectively. I consider liteaunant 
governors, secretary of states, state attorneys, secretary of states and major city mayors 
as major office holders. State House or Senate members or small city mayors are 
considered as minor office holders. 
Campaign Spending
Candidates report their campaign expenditures to the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) every quarter. I obtained these numbers from the FEC’s website. I 
divided each number with the state’s population to find per capita spending of each 
candidate. Using Consumer Price Index, I converted each number to 1998 dollars. I use 
the natural logarithm of per capita campaign spending in 1998 dollars after adding 1 to 
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this number, to make sure that the logarithm is positive and defined for candidates who 
did not spend any money.
Net Presidential Approval, Midterm Election and State Partisanship
President’s high approval numbers could help incumbent Senators of the same 
party. I take the average of all net approval numbers for the President in July, August 
and September Gallup polls of the election year. I multiply this average net approval by 
-1 if the President and the Incumbent Senator are from different parties. In midterm 
elections, President’s party has historically lost Senate seats, due to the absence of 
Presidential coattails. I include a dummy variable indicating an off-year election and 
multiply it by -1 if the President and the incumbent Senator are from two different 
parties. Gallup had a survey called State of the States in 2008, in which they asked 
350,000 Americans their party affiliation. This survey provides a number for each state 
that is found by subtracting number of Republicans from number of Democrats in that 
state. I use this number as State Partisanship and multiply it by -1 if the incumbent 
Senator’s party is not the favored party in that state.
Incumbent Scandal, Controversy, Health
Scandals, controversies or health problems of the incumbent are campaign issues 
in some elections. CQ Politics has an issue about two weeks before each election, in 
which they have a one-paragraph description of the race. I read these descriptions to 
code scandals, controversies and health/age concerns of the incumbent as three dummy 
variables.
Growth rate of state’s Real GDP
In states with better economic conditions, incumbents may find it easier to get 
reelected. I use growth rate of real GDP between the preceding year and the election 
year for each state, to capture such effects.
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Summary Statistics
Table 13 displays summary statistics. My data set includes 162 Senate Elections 
in 6 election years, from 19998 to 2008. I do not include open-seat elections or elections 
with unopposed incumbents. 138 incumbents (85%) were reelected. On average, 
incumbents received 61.9% of the two-party vote. 
Challengers were more negative than incumbents. 38.5% of TV ads sponsored by 
challengers were negative, while 24.2% of those sponsored by incumbents were 
negative. Challengers also resorted to negative trait ads (personal attacks) more often 
than incumbents (24.6% versus 18.5%). Net approval of the President ranged from -19.4 
for President Bush in 2008 to +18.9 for the same president in 2002. Most states had a 
higher number of Democrats than Republicans. Most Republican state was Utah, with a 
23 percentage point advantage, while the most Democratic state was Rhode Island, with 
a 37 percentage point advantage. 
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III. Results 
Endogeneity of Negative Campaigning
First, I estimate the following regression using OLS approach:
Where Incumbent’s Vote is the two-party vote percentage of the incumbent; 
IncumbentNegativity is the percentage of incumbent’s TV ads that were negative; 
ChallengerNegativity is the same measure for the challenger; IncumbentSpending is 
the natural logarithm of incumbent’s per capita spending in 1998 dollars; 
ChallengerSpending is the same measure for the challenger; PresidentialApproval is 
the average net approval rating of the President from all Gallup polls conducted July, 
August, and September of the election year, multiplied by -1 if the incumbent and the 
President are from different parties; MidtermElection is a dummy variable indicating 
off-year election, multiplied by -1 if the incumbent and the President are from different 
parties; StatePartisanship is the percentage of people who identify with the incumbent’s 
party minus the percent who identify with the challenger’s party in that state; 
IncumbentScandal, IncumbentControversy, IncumbentHealth are dummy variables 
indicating the existence of scandals, controversies or health/age concerns for the 
incumbent; ChallengerGovernor, ChallengerHouse, ChallengerMajor,  
ChallengerMinor are dummy variables indicating that the challenger served as the 
Governor, House Member, major office holder or minor office holder, respectively; and 
ChangeStateGDP is the growth rate of real GDP for the state from previous year to the 
election year.
There is a long literature on the effectiveness of campaign spending. 
Traditionally, challenger spending is found to be more effective than incumbent 
spending. Gerber (1998) raises the endogeneity problem in OLS regressions of election 
outcomes on campaign spending. Candidates raise more money if they expect that the 
election is likely to be close. Ignoring this endogeneity, OLS would underestimate the 
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effectiveness of incumbent spending and overestimate that of challenger spending. As in 
Gerber (1998), I use instrumental variables for incumbent spending and challenger 
spending. The instruments I use are the total spending in previous Senate election in the 
same state and voting-age population of the state. The former is expected to be 
positively correlated with both candidates’ spending, while the latter is expected to be 
negatively correlated, as more populated states would have lower per capita spending. If 
the President has high approval ratings, this should help the incumbent Senators of the 
same party. This variable also controls for “wave elections” like in 2006 or 2008, when 
incumbent Republican senators were more likely to lose the election than in a normal 
year. President’s party has historically lost power in midterm elections, when 
Presidential coattail affects are absent. I include a dummy variable to account for such 
effects. I control for incumbent scandals, controversies or health/age concerns, as these 
problems could reduce the incumbent’s vote. I also control for challengers who were 
governors, House members, major-office holders or minor office holders, as these 
previous positions can be proxies for challenger quality and they can help the challenger 
gain votes. Finally, I control for the growth rate of real GDP in the state from previous 
year to the election year, as better economic conditions are found to help the 
incumbents.
Similar to the endogeneity in campaign spending, candidates do not choose their 
campaign strategies without a consideration of the potential election results. Candidates 
who are significantly behind in the election polls may choose to attack their opponent, 
because they may feel they have nothing to lose and negative campaigning may improve 
their prospects. Furthermore, candidates with limited financial resources may choose to 
go negative, because they may think that negative campaigning would be a better use of 
their money than positive campaigning. In an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
with election outcome as the dependent variable, the estimates would be biased and 
inefficient when negative campaigning is a function of the uncertain election outcome. 
Therefore, instrumental variables estimation would be the right approach in the 
presence of such endogeneity. I use two instruments for incumbent negativity and 
challenger negativity: projected closeness of the race and regional dummies. As the race 
is more competitive, both candidates are expected to resort to negative campaigning 
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more. Competitiveness of the race would not affect the election outcome other than 
through its effect on campaign tone. In the first-stage regression, I found mid-atlantic 
and northeast states to be significantly more negative than other regions. Therefore, I 
include dummy variables for these two regions as instruments for candidate negativity. 
Election outcomes would not depend on region, other than region’s effect through 
campaign tone.
In Table 14, I report regression results from OLS regression and 2SLS regression 
with spending and negativity instruments. In the OLS regression, a ten percentage point 
increase in incumbent’s negativity reduces incumbent’s vote by 1.6 percentage points. 
This seems to provide evidence that incumbents are hurt when they sponsor negative 
ads. However, after including instruments for spending and negativity, this effect falls to 
0.5 percentage points and it ceases to be significant. On the other hand, challenger 
negativity has the intended consequence of hurting the incumbent, both in OLS and 
2SLS regressions. A ten percentage point increase in challenger negativity, reduces the 
incumbent’s vote by 1.3 and 0.9 points in OLS and 2SLS regressions, respectively. 
However, these effects are not large in magnitude. They are less likely to change the 
winner of the election in elections that are considered safe for the incumbent. In 
competitive elections, they could be the difference between winning and losing. In light 
of these results, challengers would be better off by going negative, while incumbents do 
not seem to be significantly helped or hurt by their negativity.
Incumbent spending has an insignificant effect on election outcomes, while 
challenger spending significantly reduces incumbent’s vote. Among other control 
variables, I find that state partisanship for the incumbent’s party indeed significantly 
increases incumbent’s vote.
Trait versus Issue Ads
Candidates and their campaign strategists do not only decide how often they 
would use negative TV ads, but also they decide on the content of this negativity. They 
can choose to use negative issue ads to highlight their opponents’ issue positions that 
may hurt them or they can choose to use personal attacks to criticize their opponents’ 
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character. I include percentage of negative ads that were trait-based in the 2SLS 
regression. Table 15 displays the results.
As the incumbents use more negative trait ads, they significantly hurt themselves. 
Challengers also receive significantly fewer votes as they resort to personal attacks. This 
provides evidence that explains why voters see more negative issue ads that highlight 
opponent’s voting record than personal attacks. Voters are turned off by personal 
attacks, much more than by negative issue ads.
It is plausible that voters may punish a highly negative candidate more when he 
resorts to negative trait ads than another candidate who had a lower percentage of 
negative ads and who also resorts to negative trait ads. I include interaction of negativity 
with trait ads in order to see whether voters seem to make such a distinction. Table 16 
reports the results.
Both interaction variables have relatively small and insignificant estimators. I do 
not find enough evidence to say that highly negative candidates have more to lose from 
personal attacks than less negative candidates.
Competitive Elections
In competitive elections, negative campaigning may have different effects. When 
the challenger is strong, incumbent may gain from going negative by defining the 
opponent, before he defines himself. I use elections in which no candidate received more 
than 60% of the two-party vote and run the same 2SLS regression without interaction 
variables. I exclude the interaction variables, as they do not significantly change the 
election outcome.
Table 17 reports the results. Incumbent negativity indeed becomes positively 
correlated with incumbent’s vote and it is significant. As the elections become more 
competitive, incumbents gain more from going negative. Challenger negativity still has 
the intended effect of reducing incumbent’s vote. As before, voters seem to punish the 
sponsor of negative trait ads, while negative issue ads are seen as fair.
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IV. Conclusions
In this research, I use aggregate-level data to analyze effectiveness of negative 
campaigning. Using an instrumental variables approach to address endogeneity of 
negative campaigning and distinguishing between issue ads and trait ads, I find that 
negative campaigning is effective for challengers as long as it is not based on personality 
traits of the opponent. In competitive elections, I find that negative campaigning is also 
effective for incumbents.
In light of these findings, challengers would gain the most from negative 
campaigning if they use issue ads, rather than trait ads, and if they use negative 
campaigning in elections that are projected to be close. Incumbents would gain from 
negative campaigning only when they face strong challengers and if they use issue ads.
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